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Differentially Private Exponential
Random Graphs
Vishesh Karwa and Aleksandra B. Slavkovic´ and Pavel Krivitsky
Abstract: We propose methods to release and analyze synthetic graphs in
order to protect privacy of individual relationships captured by the social
network. Proposed techniques aim at fitting and estimating a wide class
of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) in a differentially private
manner, and thus offer rigorous privacy guarantees. More specifically, we
use the randomized response mechanism to release networks under -edge
differential privacy. To maintain utility for statistical inference, treating
the original graph as missing, we propose a way to use likelihood based
inference and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to fit ERGMs
to the produced synthetic networks. We demonstrate the usefulness of the
proposed techniques on a real data example.
1. Introduction
Social networks are a prominent source of data for researchers in economics,
epidemiology, sociology and many other disciplines and have sparked a flurry of
research in statistical methodology for network analysis. In particular, the expo-
nential random graph models (ERGMs) are a very popular modeling framework
for analyzing social network data, e.g., see Goodreau, Kitts and Morris (2009),
Robins et al. (2007), Goldenberg et al. (2010). While the social benefits of ana-
lyzing these data are significant, their release can be devastating to the privacy
of individuals and organizations. For example in a famous study by Bearman,
Moody and Stovel (2004), researchers analyzed a social network of high school
students to study their romantic relationships, and more broadly to understand
the structure of human sexual networks. However, such network data are typ-
ically only protected via naive anonymization schemes (e.g., by removing the
basic identifiers such as name, social security number, etc.), which have been
shown to fail and can lead to disclosure of individual relationships or charac-
teristics associated with the released network (for more specific examples, see
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2009) and Backstrom, Dwork and Kleinberg (2007)).
In this paper, we develop techniques to provide protection to relationship
information while allowing for a valid statistical analysis of the data. We use
edge differential privacy as a model for measuring privacy risks, and develop
inference procedures for analyzing networks using the exponential random graph
models.
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2. Past work on privately estimating ERGMs
Our work is the first to develop techniques for actually fitting and estimating
a wide class of ERGMs in a differentially private manner. Previous studies on
inferring ERGMs in a private manner have only focused on releasing summary
statistics that correspond to sufficient statistics of ERGMs. For example, Karwa
et al. (2011) use the smooth sensitivity framework of Dwork et al. (2006a) to
add noise and release subgraph counts such as number of k-triangles and k-stars.
These subgraph counts are sufficient statistics for a wide class of exponential
random graph models, see for example Hunter, Goodreau and Handcock (2008).
Hay et al. (2009) propose an algorithm for releasing the degree partition of a
graph using the Laplace mechanism. They use post-processing techniques to
reduces the L2 error between the true and the released degree distribution.
Most of the previous studies dealing with private release of network data fall
short of demonstrating how to perform valid statistical inference using the noisy
statistics, which is a non-trivial task. They typically advocate using the noisy
statistics as is for inference, sometimes followed by some form of post-processing,
ignoring the noise addition process. It has been well established in statistical
literature that ignoring the noise addition process can lead to inconsistent and
biased estimates, see for example, Carroll et al. (2012) and Fuller (2009). More-
over, even if we are to proceed naively by ignoring the noise addition process and
pretend that the noisy statistics are the true sufficient statistics, we often cannot
perform inference using existing estimation procedures. This is because many
estimation procedures may fail to converge or may give meaningless results.
Fienberg and Slavkovic´ (2010), for example, show that maximum likelihood
estimators (MLEs) for log-linear models of contingency tables do not exist when
sufficient statistics are released using a generalization of mechanism proposed by
Barak et al. (2007). Karwa and Slavkovic (2012a,b), demonstrate that the MLE
may not exist when one uses Laplace mechanism and naive post-processing
techniques for releasing degree sequences of random graphs, and present new
algorithms to release graphical degree sequences which ensure that the MLE
of the β model exists; degree sequences are sufficient statistics of a class of
ERGMs known as β model. Furthermore, building on the work of Karwa et al.
(2011), Karwa and Slavkovic (2012a,b) construct an asymptotically consistent
and differentially private estimator of the β model. The main technique relies on
projecting the noisy sufficient statistics onto the lattice points of the marginal
polytope corresponding to the β model. Marginal polytopes are polytopes of
sufficient statistics and existence of MLE is directly tied to the structure of
these polytopes. However, approach of Karwa and Slavkovic (2012a,b) does not
scale to more general ERGMs as the corresponding marginal polytopes are not
well understood (Engstro¨m and Nore´n, 2010).
In this paper, we take a principled approach, rooted in likelihood theory, to
perform inference from data released by privacy preserving mechanisms. Our key
idea is to release network data using a differentially private mechanism and esti-
mate the parameters of ERGMs by taking into account the privacy mechanism.
Thus, let X = x be the data that requires protection and let P (X; θ) be a model
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one is interested in fitting. Privacy preserving mechanisms can be modeled as
P (Y |X = x, γ), i.e., the released data y is a sample from P (Y |X = x, γ) whose
parameters γ of the privacy mechanism are publicly known. Most of the current
work advocates on using P (y; θ) for inference, ignoring the privacy mechanism.
In some cases, y is post-processed to minimize some form of distance from x.
As noted earlier, using y directly can lead to invalid inferences. Declaring the
original data x as missing, we develop methods that take the privacy mechanism
into account. Thus we use the likelihood P (Y ; θ, γ) =
∑
x P (Y |X, γ)P (X; θ) for
inference. This approach offers both the improved accuracy in estimation of θ
and meaningful estimates of standard errors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we introduce the
key definitions of differential privacy and the randomized response mechanism
used to release the networks. In Section 4, we develop the inference procedures
to analyze networks released by the differentially private mechanism. Section 5
presents the experimental results, and is followed by conclusions in Section 6.
3. Differential privacy for graphs and Randomized response
This section introduces the privacy model and the notation used throughout
the paper. Let X be an undirected simple graph on n nodes with m edges. A
simple undirected graph is a graph with no directed edges, and with no self
loops and multiple edges. All the graphs considered in this paper are simple and
undirected. Let X denote the set of all simple graphs on n nodes. The distance
between two graphs X and X ′, is defined as the number of edges on which the
graphs differ and is denoted by ∆(X,X ′). Each node can have a set of attributes
associated with it. We will assume that these attributes are known and public.
Thus, we are interested in protecting the relationship information in a graph,
which is captured by edge differential privacy.
3.1. Edge Differential Privacy
Edge differential privacy is defined to protect edges in a graph (or relationships
between nodes), as the following definition illustrates.
Definition 1 (Edge Differential Privacy). Let  > 0. A randomized algorithm
A is -edge differentially private if for any two graphs X and X ′ such that
∆(X,X ′) = 1 and for any subset S of possible outputs of A,
P (A(X) ∈ S) ≤ eP (A(X ′) ∈ S).
Edge differential privacy (EDP) requires that the distribution of outputs
obtained from the algorithm A on two neighboring graphs (i.e., they differ by
one edge) should be close to each other. The parameter  controls the amount
of information leakage. Smaller  leads to lower information leakage and hence
provide stronger privacy protection.
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One nice property of differential privacy is that any function of the differ-
entially private algorithm is also differentially private as the following lemma
illustrates.
Lemma 1 (Post-processing Dwork et al. (2006b); Nissim, Raskhodnikova and
Smith (2007)). Let f be an output of a differentially private algorithm applied
to a graph X and g be any function whose domain is range of f . Then g(f(X))
is also differentially private.
3.2. Randomized response for edges
Most differentially private mechanisms perturb the output of a function f ap-
plied to a dataset. A basic algorithm for releasing the output of any function
f under EDP uses the Laplace Mechanism (e.g., see Dwork et al. (2006a)).
This mechanism adds Laplace noise to f(X) proportional to its global sensi-
tivity, which is the maximum change in f over neighboring graphs. However,
this mechanism is not suitable for releasing synthetic graphs for estimating a
large class of ERGMs. This is because in order to use the Laplace Mechanism,
we need to fix a set of models apriori and release the corresponding sufficient
statistics by estimating their sensitivity.
Remark: The techniques presented in this paper can be used for the Laplace
Mechanism as well.
An alternative way is to perturb the network directly. We call such algorithms
input perturbation algorithms. Randomized response is the simplest example of
an input perturbation algorithm where random variables are perturbed by a
known probability mechanism. Such designs have been extensively used and
studied in the context of surveys when eliciting answers to sensitive questions,
e.g., see the monograph by Chaudhuri (1987). It has also been used for statistical
disclosure control when releasing data in the form of contingency tables, e.g.,
see Hout and Heijden (2002). We will use a randomized response mechanism to
release dyads of a graph, that is subgraphs of size 2, and generate a synthetic
graph.
Let X be a random graph with n nodes, presented by its adjacency matrix.
In our setting, the adjacency matrix is a symmetric (0,1)- n × n matrix with
zeros on its diagonal, and it captures if there is an edge or not between the
nodes in the graph. We will apply randomized response to each entry of the
adjacency matrix of X. Algorithm 1 shows how to release a random graph Y
from X that is -edge differentially private. Note that for an undirected graph,
we need to release n(n−1)2 binary entries. Let p11 be the probability of the same
edge appearing in both the graphs x and y, and p00 if there is no edge in both
the graphs.
Proposition 1 (see for e.g., Ganta, Kasiviswanathan and Smith (2008)). Al-
gorithm 1 is -edge differentially private with
 = log max
{
p00
1− p11 ,
1− p11
p00
,
1− p00
p11
,
p11
1− p00
}
.
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Algorithm 1
1: Let x = {xij} be the vector representation of the adjacency matrix of X
2: for each dyad xij do
3: if xij = 1, then yij = 1 with prob p11, else yij = 0 with prob 1− p11.
4: If xij = 0, then yij = 1 with prob 1− p00, else yij = 0 with prob p00.
5: Let Y = {yij}.
6: end for
7: return Y
Proposition 1 shows that Algorithm 1 is differentially private. Note that when
any of p00 and p11 are equal to 0.5, we get  = 0, which provides no information
about the original graph and hence offers the strongest possible privacy possible.
When either of them are 1, we get  = ∞. When both p00 and p11 are 1, the
algorithm releases the original graph and offers no privacy. When p11 = 1, the
algorithm releases the edges exactly, and when p00 = 1, the algorithm releases
the non-edges exactly. We get a range of  from 0 to ∞ for intermediate values
of p00 and p11. We will assume that the parameters of this algorithm are public,
i.e., p00 and p11 are known, otherwise there are identifiability issues, that is the
parameters of the model are not identifiable.
Let 1−p00 = 1−p11 = pi, where pi is the probability of perturbing a dyad. This
is a special case of the randomized response mechanism, where we flip the state
of each dyad with probability pi. In this case, we get  = log max
{
pi
1−pi ,
1−pi
pi
}
.
Let X be the input graph and Y be the output of the randomized response
mechanism. We can think of Y as the output from a noisy sampling mechanism
applied to X. More precisely, if p00 = p11 = pi in Algorithm 1, then the output
has the following conditional distribution:
Ppi(Y |X = x) =
∏
ij
piIyij 6=xij (1− pi)Iyij=xij ,
where Iyij=xij takes value 1 if there is the same edge in graphs x and y and
zero otherwise. Note that if pi = 0.5, we cannot perform any inference on a
model for X as all information in the original data is lost. Moreover, if pi > 0.5,
the structure of graph “reverses”, i.e., edges become non-edges and vice-versa.
Hence to provide non-trivial utility, we set pi ∈ (0, 12). In this case, Algorithm
1 is -edge differentially private with  = − log pi1−pi . Note that for conservative
values of , the algorithm may not provide any utility. For instance, for a target
 = 1, pi u 0.27, meaning with probability 0.27 an edge will be flipped. With
 = 0.1, pi u 0.47, approaching 0.5. As pi approaches 0.5, the “utility” in the
perturbed network approaches 0. The question of what is the correct value of 
remains open, but in our case in order to maintain utility for inference, we do
need larger values of .
4. Likelihood based inference of ERGMs from randomized response
Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) for a multivariate distribution of
X can be parametrized in the following form according to Besag (1974); Frank
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and Strauss (1986):
P (X = x; θ) =
exp{θ·g(x)}
c(θ,X ) , x ∈ X . (1)
Here θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rq are a vector of parameters, g(x) is a vector of sufficient
statistics, and c(θ,X ) is the normalizing constant given by
c(θ,X ) =
∑
x∈X
exp{θ·g(x)}. (2)
In absence of any privacy mechanism, x is a fully observed random sam-
ple from the model given by equation 1. One of the main challenges in find-
ing the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ is that the normalizing con-
stant c(θ,X ) given by equation 2 is intractable due to the sum over all possible
graphs in X . A lot of work has been done in estimating the normalizing constant
and maximizing the likelihood for estimating ERGMs. For example, Geyer and
Thompson (1992) use a stochastic algorithm to compute the MLE for a large
class of models that includes ERGMs. They approximate the normalizing con-
stant using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, and compute the
MLE by maximizing the stochastic approximation of the likelihood. More pre-
cisely, let θ0 ∈ Θ be a fixed constant. The ratio of two normalizing constants
can be approximated as follows:
c(θ)
c(θ0)
=
∑
x′∈X
exp{θ · g(x′)}
c(θ0)
≈ 1
M
M∑
i=1
exp {(θ0 − θ)·g(Xi)},
where X1, X2, . . . , XM
i.i.d.∼ P (X = x, θ0) for some initial guess θ0. Here M is the
number of random graphs sampled. Generally, it is difficult to simulate directly
from P (X = x, θ0) and we need to resort to MCMC methods to generate the
sample. For more details on how to construct Markov chains on the space X
and to sample from ERGMs, see Snijders (2002); Handcock (2003); Morris,
Handcock and Hunter (2008).
The above algorithm used to approximate the likelihood can be extended
to infer θ from a private sample y. Such extensions were also considered in
Handcock et al. (2010) in the context of so called ignorable sampling mechanisms
for network data, i.e. when y is a sample of the original network x. Roughly,
ignorable designs are those where the sampling mechanism does not depend on
the missing data. Our setting is different because in general, differential privacy
mechanisms are not ignorable and depend on the original data. However, as we
will see, the MCMC approach of Geyer and Thompson (1992) can be extended
to estimate parameters from data released by privacy mechanisms since the
parameters of the privacy mechanism are public.
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The following discussion is general and applies to a generic privacy mechanism
Pγ(Y |X) with known γ. Recall that we wish to estimate θ using a private
sample y obtained from Pγ(Y |X = x). A naive approach is to ignore the privacy
mechanism and estimate the parameters using the naive likelihood P (X = y, θ).
The correct approach is to include the privacy mechanism in the model and use
the full likelihood of Y . We can formulate this likelihood by treating the original
data x as missing, and summing over all possible values of x. Thus, if we let
θˆmle(y) be the maximum likelihood estimator of θ obtained from y, then
θˆmle(y) = argmax
θ∈Θ
L(θ; y) (3)
= argmax
θ∈Θ
∑
x∈X
Pγ(Y = y|X = x)P (X = x; θ). (4)
For our purposes, P (X = x; θ) is the ERGM we are interested in fitting.
Pγ(Y = y|X = x) is the privacy mechanism with parameters γ. In case of the
randomized response mechanism of Algorithm 1, γ = pi.
With a bit of algebra, we can re-write the likelihood based on y as follows:
L(θ;Y = y, pi) =
c(θ|y)
c(θ)
where c(θ|y) =
∑
x∈X
eθ·g(x)Pγ(Y = y|X = x).
Thus, we need to estimate two intractable constants c(θ|y) and c(θ). They
can be approximated by using the MCMC technique of Geyer and Thompson
(1992) described previously. We need two Markov chains, one for the estimating
c(θ) and the other for estimating c(θ|y). To estimate the latter constant, the
MCMC sample needs to be weighted by the privacy weights Pγ(Y |X), which
are known. Thus, if X1, . . . XM
i.i.d.∼ P (X = x, θ0)
c(θ|y)
c(θ0)
=
∑
x′∈X
exp{θ · g(x′)}Pγ(y|Xi)
c(θ0)
≈ 1
M
M∑
i=1
exp {(θ0 − θ)·g(Xi)}Pγ(y|Xi),
where M is the number of sampled graphs.
Note the key in being able to estimate c(θ|y) is that the weights Pγ(y|Xi) can
be computed because the parameters of the privacy mechanism are known. A
similar weighting based approach but with the EM-algorithm was proposed by
Woo and Slavkovic´ (2012) for estimating logistic regression from variables sub-
ject to another privacy mechanism known as the Post Randomization Method
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(PRAM). The standard errors and confidence interval of the parameters can
be derived in the usual manner; for details see Morris, Handcock and Hunter
(2008).
5. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the proposed differentially private randomized re-
sponse algorithm to release synthetic networks and estimate the parameters of
ERGM using the missing data likelihood. Specifically, we consider a subset of
a friendship network collected in the Teenage Friends and Lifestyle Study; see
Pearson and Michell (2000) and Michell and Amos (1997). The study records a
network of friendships and substance use for a cohort of students in a school in
Scotland. In the current study, we used an excerpt of 50 adolescent girls made
available online in the Siena package (Siena, 2014). The network consists of
50 nodes and 39 edges. There are four covariates associated with each node:
Drug usage (yes or no), Smoking status (yes or no), Alcohol usage, (regular or
irregular) and Sport activity (regular or irregular).
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the covariates associated with each node
are available publicly. Our goal is to protect the relationship information in the
network x. Thus, we release the adjacency matrix of x using the randomized
response mechanism of Algorithm 1 for varying values of pi. For each value of
pi, we release 10 synthetic networks. For each released network y, we fit an
ERGM, using two different likelihoods: One that takes the privacy mechanism
into account, called the missing data likelihood, and the other that ignores the
privacy mechanism, called the naive likelihood. We fit the following ERGM to
the network:
P (X; θ) ∝ exp{θ1edges+ θ2gwesp+ θ3popularity + θ4drug + θ5sport+ θ6smoke}.
(5)
The first three terms in equation 5 capture the network structure of the
graph, and the last three terms represent the homophily effect of covariates.
The term edges measures the number of edges in the network. The term gwesp
measures the transitive effects in the network, in a weighted manner, and the
term popularity captures the degree distribution of the network. For more details
on these terms, see Morris, Handcock and Hunter (2008). We use the ergm
package (Hunter et al., 2008) in R (R Core Team, 2014) to fit the models.
We evaluate these methods by measuring the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence between the distributions implied by estimates obtained from the private
network and the true network. Let θx and θy be two parameter estimates ob-
tained by using the original network x and the private network y, respectively.
Recall that the KL divergence between the two distributions is given by the
following equation:
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Fig 1: Comparison of the private ERGM models in the Friendship dataset es-
timated using the missing data likelihood and the naive likelihood. The red
line (lower value of KL) represents the KL divergence between the estimates
based on the missing data likelihood and the MLE from the original data. The
cyan line (higher value of KL) represents the KL divergence between the esti-
mates based on the naive likelihood and the MLE. The x-axis represents the
perturbation probability pi used in to release the synthetic network.
KL(θx, θy) = Eθx
[
log
P (x, θx)
P (x, θy)
]
=
∑
x∈X
log
(
P (x, θx)
P (x, θy)
)
P (x, θx)
= (θx − θy)g(x) + log c(θy)
c(θx)
.
The KL divergence can be easily computed using the MCMC techniques
described in Section 4; see also Handcock et al. (2010) for more details. Figure
1 shows the plot of the KL divergence between the private and non-private
network on the y-axis and the perturbation probability pi on the x-axis, for
different releases of the synthetic network. The solid line represents the mean KL
divergence and the shaded region represents the 99 percent confidence region.
The dotted lines show the value of KL divergence for each released dataset. Note
that  = − log pi1−pi , so larger values of pi imply stronger privacy.
Figure 1 shows that the KL divergence between the private estimate and
the non-private estimate increases as pi increases, thus stronger privacy leads to
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Fig 2: MSE of parameter estimates of the private ERGM models in the Friend-
ship dataset estimated using the missing data likelihood and the naive likelihood.
The red line (lower values) represents the MSE of the estimates based on the
missing data likelihood. The cyan line (higher value) represents the MSE of the
estimates based on the naive likelihood and the MLE. The x-axis represents the
perturbation probability pi used in to release the synthetic network.
reduced utility. However, the KL divergence of the naive likelihood increases at
a much faster rate when compared to the missing data likelihood. This is true
especially for larger values of pi. Thus for strong privacy protection, the missing
data likelihood provides estimates that are closer to the non-private estimates
when compared to the naive likelihood.
For a more detailed evaluation of our method, we will look at the relative
mean squared error (MSE) of individual parameter estimates. The error is cal-
culated as the mean squared difference between the estimates obtained by the
private network and the estimates from the true network. Figure 2 shows a
plot of MSE for each parameter in the ERGM model. Note that the first three
parameters capture the relational structure of the network and the last three
parameters measure the main effects of the nodal covariates Drug , Smoke and
Sport . Table 1 shows the estimate of mean percentage relative efficiency of the
parameters, i.e., it shows the ratio MSE[Missing]MSE[Naive] in form of percentage. In the
table, values less than 100 favor the proposed missing data estimator.
Figure 2 and Table 1 show that for structural parameters, the MSE of es-
timates based on missing data likelihood are much smaller when compared to
those based on the naive likelihood. This is true specially for larger values of pi.
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Table 1
Table of Relative efficiency of the estimators,
MSE[Missing]
MSE[Naive]
for different values pi of
perturbing a dyad.
Parameter
pi Popularity edges GWESP Drug Smoke Sport
0.005 16.5 38.1 9.8 43.4 59.2 37.7
0.01 26.1 80.4 15.8 74.4 69.4 31.8
0.02 17.6 51.7 7.9 58.8 105.3 24.6
0.03 19.9 49.3 10.2 13.2 124.3 49.4
For the parameters related to the homophily effects, the missing data estimates
also have lower MSE when compared to the naive estimates. However, the dif-
ference is not as drastic as for the structural parameters, especially in case of
the node covariate smoke. This is due to the fact that the nodal characteristics
are assumed to be public, hence the parameter estimates are effected only by
the changes in the total number of edges between nodes of the same covariate
value. In fact, for the smoke parameter, in some cases, as seen in Table 1, the
naive estimator seems to do better in terms of MSE. For the structural param-
eter gwesp, the improvement in efficiency is quite substantial when using the
missing data likelihood.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present an -edge differentially private algorithm to release and
estimate exponential random graph models. We release synthetic networks using
a randomized response mechanism. By treating the original data as missing, we
incorporate the privacy mechanism into the likelihood for estimating the param-
eters. We show that missing data methodology and MCMC techniques can be
directly extended to maximize the likelihood of data released by a differentially
private mechanism and more generally any privacy preserving mechanisms.
Simulation studies show that our proposed approach leads to estimates with
much lower mean squared errors when compared to those obtained by ignor-
ing the privacy mechanism. Although we advocate the use of missing data and
MCMC techniques by analysts who use data obtained from a differentially pri-
vate mechanism, or more general privacy-preserving mechanisms, they can also
be used by data curators to release synthetic graphs for performing preliminary
analysis of other models. Indeed, using our techniques, the data curator can fit
an ERGM to the data and release synthetic graphs from the ERGM. The utility
of the synthetic graphs may depend on the goodness-of-fit of the ERGM chosen
by the data curator, and this requires further careful investigation.
In this paper, we assumed that the covariate information is available publicly,
which may not always be the case. We are currently working on relaxing this
assumption and releasing synthetic graphs that protect both nodal and struc-
tural information in a graph. Future investigations will also include evaluating
the usefulness of this approach for different sizes and sparsity of networks and
other ERGM specifications.
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